This was an extremely well informed, responsive ring that was able to get information "directly from German General Staff headquarters" often on specific request. It has been alleged that "Lucy" was in major part a conduit for the British to feed Ultra intelligence to the soviets in a way that made it appear to have come from highly placed espionage rather than from cryptanalysis of German radio traffic. The soviets, however, through an agent at Bletchley, john cairncross, knew that Britain had broken Enigma. The "Lucy" ring was initially treated with suspicion by the soviets. The information it provided was accurate and timely however, and soviet agents in Switzerland (including their chief, Alexander Radó ) eventually learned to take it seriously. 37 Use of intelligence edit most deciphered messages, often about relative trivia, were insufficient as intelligence reports for military strategists or field commanders.
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In the sis this intelligence was handled interview by "Section V" based at St Albans. Radio and cryptography edit The communications system was founded by Brigadier Sir Richard Gambier-Parry, who from 1938 to 1946 was head of MI6 Section viii, based at Whaddon Hall in Buckinghamshire,. Ultra summaries from Bletchley park were sent over landline to the section viii radio transmitter at Windy ridge. From there they were transmitted to the destination slus. The communications element of each slu was called a "Special Communications Unit" or scu. Radio transmitters were constructed at Whaddon Hall workshops, while receivers were the national hro, made in the usa. The scus were highly mobile and the first such units used civilian Packard cars. The following scus are listed: scu1 (Whaddon Hall scu2 (France before 1940, India scu3 lab (rss hanslope park scu5, scu6 (possibly Algiers and Italy scu7 (training unit in the uk scu8 (Europe after D-day scu9 (Europe after D-day scu11 (Palestine and India scu12 (India scu13 and. C The cryptographic element of each slu was supplied by the raf and was based on the typex cryptographic machine and one-time pad systems. Rn ultra messages from the oic to ships at sea were necessarily transmitted over normal naval radio circuits and were protected by one-time pad encryption. Lucy edit An intriguing question concerns the alleged use of Ultra information by the "Lucy" spy ring, 36 headquartered in Switzerland and apparently operated by one man, rudolf roessler.
Mobile slus were attached to field army and air force headquarters, and depended on radio communications to receive intelligence summaries. The first mobile slus appeared during the French campaign of 1940. A writers slu supported the British Expeditionary force (BEF) headed by general Lord Gort. The first liaison officers were robert Gore-Browne and Humphrey plowden. A second slu of the 1940 period was attached to the raf advanced Air Striking Force at meaux commanded by air Vice-marshal yon Playfair. This slu was commanded by Squadron leader. Intelligence agencies edit In 1940, special arrangements were made within the British intelligence services for handling boniface and later Ultra intelligence. The security service started "Special Research Unit B1(b under Herbert Hart.
The main function of the resume liaison officer or his deputy was to pass Ultra intelligence bulletins to the commander of the command he was attached to, or to other indoctrinated staff officers. In order to safeguard Ultra, special precautions were taken. The standard procedure was for the liaison officer to present the intelligence summary to the recipient, stay with him while he studied it, then take it back and destroy. By the end of the war, there were about 40 slus serving commands around the world. Fixed slus existed at the Admiralty, the war Office, the air Ministry, raf fighter Command, the us strategic Air Forces in Europe (Wycombe Abbey) and other fixed headquarters in the. An slu was operating at the war hq in Valletta, malta. 31 These units had permanent teleprinter links to Bletchley park.
The codeword "ultra" was adopted in June 1941. This codeword was reportedly suggested by commander geoffrey colpoys, rn, who served in the rn oic. Army and air force edit The distribution of Ultra information to Allied commanders and units in the field involved considerable risk of discovery by the germans, and great care was taken to control both the information and knowledge of how it was obtained. Liaison officers were appointed for each field command to manage and control dissemination. Dissemination of Ultra intelligence to field commanders was carried out by mi6, which operated Special liaison Units (SLU) attached to major army and air force commands. The activity was organized and supervised on behalf of MI6 by Group Captain. Each slu included intelligence, communications, and cryptographic elements. It was headed by a british Army or raf officer, usually a major, known as "Special liaison Officer".
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13 Italian edit In June 1940, the Italians were using book codes for most of their military messages, except for the Italian navy which, in early 1941 had started using a version of the hagelin rotor-based cipher machine c-38. This was broken from June 1941 onwards by the Italian subsection of gc cs at Bletchley park. Japanese edit In the pacific theatre, a japanese cipher machine, called " Purple " by the Americans, was used for highest-level Japanese diplomatic traffic. It produced revision a polyalphabetic substitution cipher, but unlike enigma, was not a rotor machine, being built around electrical stepping switches. It was broken by the us army signal Intelligence service and disseminated as magic. Detailed reports by the japanese ambassador to germany were encrypted on the purple machine. His reports included reviews of Germany assessments of the military situation, of strategy and intentions, reports on direct inspections (in one case, of Normandy beach defences) by the ambassador and reports of long interviews with Hitler.
The chief fleet communications code system used by the Imperial Japanese navy was called jn-25 by the Americans and by early 1942, they had made considerable progress in decrypting Japanese naval messages. The japanese are said to have obtained an Enigma machine in 1937, although it is debated whether they were given it by the germans or bought a commercial version which apart from the plugboard and internal wirings, was the german heer/Luftwaffe machine. The japanese did not use it for their most secret communications, having developed a similar machine. Distribution edit average number of daily Ultra dispatches to field commanders during the second World War Army- and air force-related intelligence derived from signals intelligence (sigint) sources—mainly Enigma decrypts in Hut 6 —was compiled in summaries at gc cs ( Bletchley park ) Hut. The volume of the intelligence reports going out to commanders in the field built up gradually. Naval Enigma decoded in Hut 8 was forwarded from Hut 4 to the Admiralty Operational Intelligence centre (oic which were distributed initially under the codeword "hydro".
On, the polish Cipher Bureau handed reconstructed Enigma machines and their techniques for decrypting ciphers to the French and British. Gordon Welchman wrote, ultra would never have got off the ground if we had not learned from the poles, in the nick of time, the details both of the german military Enigma machine, and of the operating procedures that were in use. — Gordon Welchman At Bletchley park, some of the key people responsible for success against Enigma included mathematicians Alan Turing and Hugh Alexander and, at the British Tabulating Machine company, chief engineer Harold keen. 13 After the war, interrogation of German cryptographic personnel, led to the conclusion that German cryptanalysts understood that cryptanalytic attacks against Enigma were possible but were thought to require impracticable amounts of effort and investment. The poles' early start at breaking Enigma and the continuity of their success, gave the Allies an advantage when World War ii began. Lorenz cipher edit main article: Cryptanalysis of the lorenz cipher In June 1941, the germans started to introduce on-line stream cipher teleprinter systems for strategic point-to-point radio links, to which the British gave the code-name fish.
Several systems were used, principally the lorenz sz 40/42 (Tunny) and Geheimfernschreiber ( Sturgeon ). These cipher systems were cryptanalysed, particularly tunny, which the British thoroughly penetrated. It was eventually attacked using Colossus, which were the first digital programme-controlled electronic computers. In many respects the tunny work was more difficult than for the Enigma, since the British codebreakers had no knowledge of the machine producing it nor the head-start that the poles had given them against Enigma. 13 Although the volume of intelligence derived from this system was much smaller than that from Enigma, its importance was often far higher because it produced primarily high-level, strategic intelligence that was sent between Wehrmacht High Command (OKW). The eventual bulk decryption of Lorenz-enciphered messages contributed significantly and perhaps decisively, to the defeat of nazi germany. 22 23 nevertheless, the tunny story has become much less well-known among the public than the Enigma one. 13 At Bletchley park, some of the key people responsible for success in the tunny effort included mathematicians. "Bill" Tutte and Max Newman and electrical engineer Tommy Flowers.
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These produced a polyalphabetic substitution cipher and were widely thought to be unbreakable in the 1920s, when a variant of the commercial Model D was first used by the reichswehr. The german Army, navy, air Force, nazi party, gestapo and German diplomats used Enigma machines in several variants. Abwehr (German military intelligence) used a four-rotor machine without a plugboard and naval Enigma used different key management from that of the army or air force, making its traffic far more difficult to cryptanalyse; each variant required different cryptanalytic treatment. The commercial versions were not as secure and Dilly Knox of gc cs, is said to have broken one before the war. German military Enigma was first broken in December 1932 dillard by the polish Cipher Bureau, using a combination of brilliant mathematics, the services of a spy in the german office responsible for administering encrypted communications, and good luck. The poles read Enigma to the outbreak of World War ii and beyond, in France. At the turn of 1939, the germans made the systems ten times more complex, which required a tenfold increase offer in Polish decryption equipment, which they could not meet.
In fact he was reading his mail." over time, ultra has become embedded in the public consciousness and Bletchley park has become a significant visitor attraction. 12 As stated by historian Thomas haigh, "The British code-breaking effort of the second World War, formerly secret, is now one of the most celebrated aspects of modern British history, an inspiring story in which a free society mobilized its intellectual resources against a terrible. In the early phases of the war, particularly during the eight-month Phoney war, the germans could transmit most of their messages using land lines and so had no need to use radio. This meant that those at Bletchley park had some time to build up experience of collecting and starting to decrypt messages on the various radio networks. German Enigma messages were the main source, with those of the luftwaffe predominating, as they used radio more and their operators were particularly ill-disciplined. German edit minute a typical Bletchley intercept sheet, before decryption and translation. A typical Bletchley intercept sheet, after decryption. Enigma edit main article: Cryptanalysis of the Enigma " Enigma " refers to a family of electro-mechanical rotor cipher machines.
Winston Churchill was reported to have told King george vi, when presenting to him Stewart Menzies (head of the secret Intelligence service and the person who controlled distribution of Ultra decrypts to the government "It is thanks to the secret weapon of General Menzies, put. Winterbotham"d the western Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight. Eisenhower, at war's end describing Ultra as having been "decisive" to Allied victory. Sir Harry hinsley, bletchley park veteran and official historian of British Intelligence in World War ii, made a similar assessment of Ultra, saying that while the Allies would have won the war without it, "the war would have been something like two years longer, perhaps. 10 The existence of Ultra was kept secret for many years after the war. After it was revealed in the middle 1970s, historians have altered the historiography of World War. For example, andrew Roberts, writing in the 21st century, states, "Because he had the invaluable advantage of being able to read General Erwin Rommel's Enigma communications, field Marshall Bernard Montgomery knew how short the germans were of men, ammunition, food and above all fuel. When he put Rommel's picture up in his caravan he wanted to be seen to be almost reading his opponent's mind.
The code name, boniface was used as a cover name for. In order to ensure that the successful code-breaking did not become apparent to the germans, British intelligence created a fictional MI6 master spy, boniface, who controlled a fictional series of agents throughout Germany. Information obtained through code-breaking was often attributed to the human intelligence from the boniface network. 3 4, the. Used the codename, magic for its decrypts from Japanese sources including the so-called "Purple" cipher. Much of the, german cipher traffic was encrypted on the. Used properly, the german military Enigma would biography have been virtually unbreakable; in practice, shortcomings in operation allowed it to be broken. The term "Ultra" has often been used almost synonymously with " Enigma decrypts ".
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For other uses, see, ultra (disambiguation). Three cipher machines that were broken by the paperwork Allies to yield Ultra intelligence. Ultra was the designation adopted by, british military intelligence in June 1941 for wartime signals intelligence obtained by breaking high-level encrypted enemy radio and teleprinter communications at the, government Code and Cypher School (gc cs). Ultra eventually became the standard designation among the western. Allies for all such intelligence. The name arose because the intelligence thus obtained was considered more important than that designated by the highest British security classification then used most Secret ) and so was regarded as being. Several other cryptonyms had been used for such intelligence.